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North Carolina General Statutes Section 97-31: Must it
Provide Exclusive Compensation for Workers who Suffer
Scheduled Injuries?
The North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act' establishes three ave-
nues of compensation for injured workers. First, section 97-29 provides bene-
fits to workers who are unable to work as a result of an injury.2 Second,
section 97-30 makes benefits available to workers who are able to earn some
wages but less than the amount that they were earning prior to their injury.3
The amount of compensation awarded to workers under these two sections is
determined by the duration of a worker's disability.4 Finally, section 97-31
awards compensation to workers even if they suffer no diminution of earning
capacity as a result of their injury.5 Unlike sections 97-29 and 97-30, compen-
sation under section 97-31 is limited to a fixed duration and a list of specifi-
cally enumerated injuries.6 This compensation is "in lieu of all other
I. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -122 (1979 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
2. The pertinent part of id. § 97-29 (Cum. Supp. 1983) provides:
Except as hereinafter otherwise provided, where the incapacity for work resulting
from the injury is total, the employer shall pay or cause to be paid, as hereinafter pro-
vided, to the injured employee during such total disability a weekly compensation equal
to sixty-six and two-thirds percent (66S%) of his average weekly wages, but not more
than the amount established annually to be effective October I as provided herein, nor
less than thirty dollars ($30.00) per week.
3. The pertinent part ofid. § 97-30 provides:
Except as otherwise provided in G.S. 97-31, where the incapacity for work resulting
from the injury is partial, the employer shall pay, or cause to be paid, as hereinafter
provided, to the injured employee during such disability, a weekly compensation equal
to sixty-six and two-thirds percent (66%%) of the difference between his average weekly
wages before the injury and the average weekly wages which he is able to earn thereafter,
but not more than the amount established annually to be effective October 1 as provided
in G.S. 97-29 a week, and in no case shall the period covered by such compensation be
greater than 300 weeks from the date of injury.
4. Id. §§ 97-29, -30; see id. § 97-2(9) (1979) (definition of "disability" under the Act).
5. Watts v. Brewer, 243 N.C. 422, 424, 90 S.E.2d 764, 767 (1956); Anderson v. Northwestern
Motors, 233 N.C. 372, 374, 64 S.E.2d 265, 266 (1951); Loflin v. Loflin, 13 N.C. App. 574, 577, 186
S.E.2d 660, 662, cert. denied, 281 N.C. 154, 187 S.E.2d 585 (1972).
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31 (1979) provides:
In cases included by the following schedule the compensation in each case shall be paid
for disability during the healing period and in addition the disability shall be deemed to
continue for the period specified, and shall be in lieu of all other compensation, includ-
ing disfigurement, to wit:
(1) For the loss of a thumb, sixty-six and two-thirds percent (663%) of the average
weekly wages during 75 weeks.
(2) For the loss of a first finger, commonly called the index finger, sixty-six and two
thirds percent (662A%) of the average weekly wages during 45 weeks.
(3) For the loss of a second finger, sixty-six and two-thirds percent (6635%) of the
average weekly wages during 40 weeks.
(24) In case of the loss of or permanent injury to any important external or internal
organ or part of the body for which no compensation is payable under any other subdivi-
sion of this section, the Industrial Commission may award proper and equitable compen-
sation not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31 (1979).
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compensation. ' 7 The critical language of section 97-31 provides: "In cases
included by the following schedule the compensation in each case shall be
paid for disability during the healing period and in addition the disability
shall be deemed to continue for the period specified, and shall be in lieu of all
other compensation, including disfigurement. . .. "8
The North Carolina Supreme Court has interpreted section 97-3 I's "in
lieu of' proviso as entitling an injured employee to compensation exclusively
under the schedule, if all his injuries are included in it.9 The court of appeals
adhered to this view1 o until 1983 when it rejected the exclusive compensation
theory in West v. Bladenboro Cotton Mills, Inc. 1 and Cook v. Bladenboro Cot-
ton Mills, Inc. 12 Instead of viewing section 97-31 as an exclusive source of
compensation for a worker with a scheduled injury, West and Cook inter-
preted section 97-31 as an alternative basis of compensation for a worker who
also qualified under another compensatory section of the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act.13 This rationale allows a worker to elect the most favorable statutory
remedy; if he chooses to receive compensation under section 97-31, however,
he cannot recover additional compensation under another section of the Act,14
because compensation under section 97-31 is "in lieu of all other
compensation."
The Cook and West interpretations of section 97-31 are more equitable
and more consistent with the underlying policy of the workers' compensation
law than the supreme court's construction. Although these cases depart from
precedent set by a higher court, they should not be overruled. Instead, the
supreme court should reevaluate its interpretation of section 97-31 and, at the
earliest opportunity, approve the court of appeals' approach.
Cook and West are strikingly similar. In both cases, claimants were em-
ployed for most of their adult lives at the Bladenboro Cotton Mills where they
were exposed to high levels of cotton dust. When Bladenboro was purchased
by Highland Mills in 1979, neither claimant obtained employment because
pulmonary testing revealed that their lungs were impaired.' 5 Both plaintiffs
had little hope of securing other employment. Cook had "to take her time in
climbing stairs and [could] become over exerted while sweeping."' 16 She un-
successfully sought work at the local employment agency and was turned
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See Perry v. Hibriten Furniture Co., 296 N.C. 88, 249 S.E.2d 397 (1978).
10. See Baldwin v. North Carolina Memorial Hosp., 32 N.C. App. 779, 233 S.E.2d 600
(1977); Loftin v. Loflin, 13 N.C. App. 574, 186 S.E.2d 660, cert. denied, 281 N.C. 154, 187 S.E.2d
585 (1972); Dudley v. Downtowner Motor Inn, 13 N.C. App. 474, 186 S.E.2d 188 (1972).
11. 62 N.C. App. 267, 302 S.E.2d 645 (1983).
12. 61 N.C. App. 562, 300 S.E.2d 852 (1983).
13. West, 62 N.C. App. at 270-71, 302 S.E.2d at 648; Cook, 61 N.C. App. at 565-66, 300
S.E.2d at 854-55.
14. West, 62 N.C. App. at 271, 302 S.E.2d at 648. See also supra text accompanying note 8.
15. West, 62 N.C. App. at 268, 302 S.E.2d at 646; Cook, 61 N.C. App. at 563-65, 300 S.E.2d
at 853-54.
16. Cook, 61 N.C. App. at 563, 300 S.E.2d at 853.
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down for ajob at a retail store. 17 Similarly, West had "a fifth grade education
and no significant training outside the cotton textile industry."' 8 Both claim-
ants sought lifetime compensation under section 97-29 for total and permanent
disability. The Industrial Commission, however, made a lump sum award to
both claimants. The Commission awarded Cook 3000 dollars under section
97-31(24), which provides compensation not to exceed 10,000 dollars for per-
manent injury to any important internal organ for which no scheduled com-
pensation is otherwise payable. 19 West received a 6000 dollar lump sum
award. Although the Commission did not specify the statutory basis for the
judgment, the court of appeals assumed that the award was pursuant to the
same section.20
The court of appeals remanded both cases to the Industrial Commission
with instructions to reconsider claimants' arguments that they were disabled 21
within the meaning of section 97-29.22 The court interpreted section 97-29 as
an alternative basis for compensation for workers who suffered an injury also
compensable under section 97-31. The West court, citing the North Carolina
Supreme Court decision in Perry v. Hibriten Furniture Co. ,23 concluded that
the "in lieu of other compensation" clause of section 97-31 would permit a
recovery under either section 97-31 or section 97-29, but not both.24
Although the West decision cited the supreme court as authority, the
Perry court actually adopted a broader view of the "in lieu of' clause than
that attributed to it. In Perry, decided unanimously in 1978, the supreme court
had held that the "in lieu of' clause did not merely prohibit double recovery
under section 97-31 and another section, but that it compelled recovery under
only section 97-31.25 The claimant in Perry had suffered a work-related injury
while employed by the Hibriten Furniture Company. Medical experts agreed
that he lost between twenty-five and seventy-five percent of the use of his back.
17. Id. at 565, 300 S.E.2d at 854.
18. West, 62 N.C. App. at 268, 302 S.E.2d at 646.
19. Cook, 61 N.C. App. at 563-65, 300 S.E.2d at 853-55.
20. West, 62 N.C. App. at 269-70, 302 S.E.2d at 645-66.
21. "Disability" is a term of art. It does not refer to physical injury as such, but rather to loss
of earning ability. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(9) (1979). Total disability is a prerequisite to compen-
sation under section 97-29. Id. § 97-29 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
22. The court's language in West illustrates the policy considerations that caused it to depart
from the supreme court's decision in Perry v. Hibriten Furniture Co., 296 N.C. 88, 249 S.E.2d 397
(1978). In West the court stated:
Upon remand, if the Commission finds plaintiff has a disability because of the occupa-
tional disease, then the statutory basis for compensation should be specified. An award
for damage to the lungs may be made under G.S. 97-31(24) .... But such an award, by
the express terms of the statute, would be in lieu of all other compensation. Perry Y.
[Hibriten] Furniture Co., 296 N.C. 88, 249 S.E.2d 397 (1978). Such an award may also be
based on G.S. 97-29. . . . In many instances, an award under G.S. 97-29 better fulfills
the policy of the Workers' Compensation Act than an award under G.S. 97-31 because it
is a more favorable remedy and is more directly related to compensating inability to
work.
West, 62 N.C. App. at 270-71, 302 S.E.2d at 648.
23. 296 N.C. 88, 249 S.E.2d 397 (1978).
24. West, 62 N.C. App. at 271, 302 S.E.2d at 648.
25. Perry, 296 N.C. at 93-94, 249 S.E.2d at 401.
1464 [Vol. 62
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Their testimony indicated that Perry was "probably unable to carry out gain-
ful employment" and "probably disabled from any useful occupation.
26
Perry testified that he continued to suffer pain in his back and legs and could
no longer lift or bend without hurting.27 The Industrial Commission con-
cluded that Perry sustained a fifty percent loss of the use of his back and
awarded him 150 weeks' compensation under section 97-31(23). Perry alleged
that he was totally disabled and should have been awarded compensation
under section 97-29.28 The supreme court quoted section 97-31, emphasizing
the phrase "in lieu of all other compensation."2 9 It then held that section 97-
31 was claimant's exclusive remedy:
The language of G.S. 97-31 .. .compels the conclusion that if by
reason of a compensable injury an employee is unable to work and
earn any wages he is totally disabled, G.S. 97-2(9), and entitled to
compensation for permanent total disability under G.S. 97-29 unless
all his injuries are included in the schedule set out in G.S. 97-31. In that
event the injured employee is entitled to compensation exclusively
under G.S. 97-31 regardless of his ability or inability to earn wages in
the same or any other employment.30
The court of appeals' decisions in Cook and West circumvented the Perry
holding. If the court of appeals had followed the Perry rule, it would not have
allowed West and Cook the opportunity to recover compensation under sec-
tion 97-29, the disability section of the Workers' Compensation Act, because
under Perry, an "injured employee is entitled to compensation exclusively
under section 97-31 regardless of his ability or inability" to work.3 1
Because more than one reasonable interpretation of the "in lieu of' clause
exists, the legislature's intent in ratifying this clause is important. Unfortu-
nately, the clause's legislative history is inconclusive. The circumstances sur-
rounding the adoption of the clause may be viewed as supporting either the
Perry or the Cook-West rule.
The legislature apparently adopted the "in lieu of' clause in response to
the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in the case of Stanley v. Hyman-
Michaels Co. 32 In Stanley the supreme court considered an earlier version of
section 97-31 that did not contain the "in lieu of' clause.33 Plaintiff had suf-
fered two scheduled injuries, the loss of his left leg and the loss of the use of
fifty percent of his right foot, in an industrial accident. The Industrial Com-
mission noted that section 97-31 explicitly provided that the loss of both arms
or hands, or vision in both eyes "'shall be deemed permanent total disabil-
26. Id. at 90-91, 249 S.E.2d at 399-400.
27. Id. at 92, 249 S.E.2d at 400.
28. Id. at 89, 249 S.E.2d at 398-99.
29. Id. at 93, 249 S.E.2d at 401.
30. Id. at 93-94, 249 S.E.2d at 401 (emphasis in original).
31. Id.
32. 222 N.C. 257, 22 S.E.2d 570 (1942).
33. North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act, ch. 120, § 31, 1929 N.C. Sess. Laws 117,
130 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-1 to -122 (1979 & Cum. Supp. 1983)).
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ity,' ,,34 and shall be compensated under section 97-29, but did not state that
the loss of a leg and the partial loss of the other foot would constitute such
disability.35 Thus, the Commission concluded that claimant's exclusive rem-
edy was the scheduled payments provided by section 97-31.36 The supreme
court reversed the Commission, recognizing that although the combinations of
injuries specified in section 97-31 were conclusively presumed to cause total
and permanent disability, other injuries also were capable of causing such dis-
ability.3 7 The court held that the Commission had "power to find that other
injuries or combination of injuries occurring in the same accident may result
in permanent total disability and when the Commission so finds, the injured
employee should be compensated as provided in [the predecessor to section
97-29]. "38 Thus, Stanley allowed claimant to prove permanent and total disa-
bility and receive compensation under section 97-29 even though his injuries
would have been compensable under section 97-31. When the legislature con-
vened the following spring, however, it amended section 97-31 to include the
"in lieu of" clause.39
Although the holding discussed above may have elicited this prompt leg-
islative response, a closer reading of Stanley suggests that the legislature
amended section 97-31 because of the court's disposition of a different issue in
that case. When Stanley was decided, section 97-31 included a provision au-
thorizing the Commission "to make and award a reasonable compensation for
any serious bodily disfigurement received by any employee within the mean-
ing of this Act, not to exceed twenty-five hundred ($2,500) dollars."'40 The
Commission had stated that, as a matter of law, plaintiff was not entitled to
recover scheduled compensation for loss of particular bodily parts and then
recover additional compensation under the disfigurement section, when the
disfigurement resulted from the same loss of bodily parts for which compensa-
tion already had been awarded. 41 On appeal defendants urged the supreme
court to affirm the Commission's decision. The supreme court reviewed the
legislative history of section 97-31, and noted that the "in lieu of" clause had
appeared in the original workers' compensation bill. The clause was deleted,
however, before the General Assembly adopted the Act.42 Relying on the fact
that the legislature had deleted the "in lieu of" clause during its debate, the
court stated: "We think the statute does authorize the Commission to award
compensation for serious disfigurement resulting from the loss or partial loss
34. Stanley, 222 N.C. at 260, 22 S.E.2d at 572 (quoting the North Carolina Workmen's Com-
pensation Act, ch. 120, § 31(t), 1929 N.C. Sess. Laws 117, 131) (current version at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 97-1 to -122 (1979 & Cum. Supp. 1983)).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 260, 22 S.E.2d at 572.
37. Id. at 260-61, 22 S.E.2d at 572-73.
38. Id. at 260, 22 S.E.2d at 572-73.
39. Act of March 5, 1943, ch. 502, § 2, 1943 N.C. Sess. Laws 556, 556 (current version at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 97-31 (1979)).
40. North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act, ch. 120, § 31(t), 1929 N.C. Sess. Laws
117, 131 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-1 to -122 (1979 & Cum. Supp. 1983)).
41. Stanley, 222 N.C. at 262, 22 S.E.2d at 573.
42. Id. at 263, 22 S.E.2d at 574.
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of a member for which compensation is provided in the schedules. '43 Thus,
Stanley authorized two awards under section 97-31 for one injury---one award
for the injury itself, and another award for disfigurement arising out of the
injury.
It is entirely possible that the General Assembly added the "in lieu of'
clause to section 97-31 to make clear its intention not to allow double compen-
sation within section 97-31. Significantly, the amended version of section 97-
31 provides: "In cases included by the following schedule, the compensation
in each case.. . shall be in lieu of all other compensation including disfigure-
ment. . . ." By appending the "in lieu of' clause to section 97-3 1, the Gen-
eral Assembly may not have intended to change the portion of Stanley
permitting disabled claimants to recover under section 97-29 rather than under
section 97-31. The circumstances surrounding this amendment, therefore, do
not compel the interpretation of section 97-31 expressed in Perry and, in fact,
support the interpretation that views the "in lieu of' clause as a measure to
prevent double recovery. Because neither the language of section 97-31 nor its
legislative history compel the Perry interpretation, the supreme court should
consider the merits of the Cook and West interpretations of the section.
Three strong policy factors support the interpretation of section 97-31 of-
fered by Cook and West. Those factors are: (1) the earning impairment prin-
ciple of workers' compensation law, (2) the goal of achieving equitable results
in individual cases, and (3) the necessity of construing section 97-31 in a man-
ner that will not vitiate section 97-29. The earning impairment principle rec-
ognizes that workers' compensation disability benefits are predicated on the
extent of earning impairment that a worker sustains as a result of injury,
rather than the degree of physical impairment.4 5 This principle represents a
compromise between the employer's and employee's interests. The employee
surrenders his right to common-law damages in return for guaranteed, fixed
compensation. The employer foregoes his right to deny liability altogether, in
return for liability limited to the employee's loss of earning capacity.46 Thus,
43. Id. at 264, 22 S.E.2d at 575.
44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31 (1979) (emphasis added).
45. See 2 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 57.11 (1983). There are
essentially two views concerning the type of disability tharworkers' compensation should redress.
Benefits should compensate for economic loss-lost wages or the impairment of the ability to earn
wages--or compensate for physical loss or the functional impairment of muscles, tendons, and
bones with their attendant psychological effects. Most workers' compensation statutes reflect the
earning impairment viewpoint. For example, in North Carolina's Act, "It]he term 'disability'
means incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the
time of injury in the same or any other employment." N.C. GEN STAT. § 97-2(9) (1979). Cf. Hall
v. Thomason Chevrolet, Inc., 263 N.C. 569, 574-75, 139 S.E.2d 857, 861 (1965) ("Under the Work-
men's Compensation Act disability refers not to physidal infirmity but to a diminished capacity to
earn money."). For a thorough discussion of these viewpoints and the influence of the earning
impairment principle in compensation law, see 2 A. LARSON, supra, § 57-14(a)-(j).
46. New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 203-04 (1917). Cf. Conrad v. Cook-Lewis
Foundry Co., 198 N.C. 723, 725-26, 153 S.E. 266, 268 (1930) (quoting Stertz v. Industrial Ins.
Comm'n of Wash., 91 Wash. 588, 590, 158 P. 256, 258 (1916)):
[T]he act under consideration contains elements of a mutual concession between the
employer and the employee .... "Both had suffered under the old system; the employ-
ers by heavy judgements,. . . the workmen through the old defenses or exhaustion in
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the earning impairment principle eliminates the practical problems of a sub-
jective measurement of evaluating disability.47 By requiring the Industrial
Commission to reevaluate claimants' section 97-29 claims in Cook and West,
the court of appeals attempted to tie the awarding of compensation to the ac-
tual earning disability incurred. As the court observed in West, "[iln many
instances, an award under G.S. 97-29 better fulfills the policy of the Workers'
Compensation Act than an award under G.S. 97-31 because it is a more
favorable remedy and is more directly related to compensating inability to
work."'48 Cook and West, therefore, adhere to the earning impairment princi-
ple of compensation.
The equitable results achieved in Cook and West attest to the validity of
the earning impairment principle and provide further support for the court of
appeals' interpretation of section 97-31. Although Cook and West suffered
only a partial loss of respiratory function as a result of their injuries, 49 they
were unemployable in the industry in which they had labored for most of their
adult lives. With several years remaining before they reached retirement age,
their 3000 dollar50 and 6000 dollar5' awards would not have sustained them.
Thus, there was a substantial likelihood that they would become wards of the
State. The court of appeals' decision to afford Cook and West an opportunity
to prove total and permanent disability was in their best interests and the best
interests of society.
The final factor favoring the court of appeals' interpretation of the "in
lieu of" clause is that the decisions in Cook and West were necessary to ensure
the continued vitality of section 97-29. The subsection of 97-31 under which
the Commission awarded Cook and West compensation, section 97-31(24),
provides compensation for an indefinite range of injuries including permanent
injury "to any important external or internal organ or part of the body" for
which no scheduled compensation is otherwise payable.5 2 Since every disa-
wasteful litigation. Both wanted peace. The master, in exchange for limited liability,
was willing to pay on some claims in [the] future, where in the past there had been no
liability at all. The servant was willing not only to give up trial by jury, but to accept far
less than he had often won in court; provided he was sure to get the small sum without
having to fight for it."
47. See 2 A. LARSON, supra note 45, § 57-14(h). How does one meaningfully compare the
loss of a hand with the loss of a foot and assign a value to each without taking into account the
extent of a worker's earning impairment? The medical impairment approach, see supra note 45,
has influenced the award of scheduled compensation for loss of members. For example, sched-
uled benefits must be paid even if a worker suffers no decrease in earning ability as a result of
injury. See supra text accompanying note 5. Despite the influence of the medical impairment
approach, however, the amount of scheduled compensation payable for the loss of a hand or foot
is determined on the basis of former income. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31(12), (14) (1979).
48. West, 62 N.C. App. at 271,302 S.E.2d at 648. In contrast to West, the Perry approach did
not attempt to relate compensation to a worker's actual earning impairment. Under Per y if a
worker suffered a scheduled injury, he received the limited compensation available there "regard-
less of his ability or inability to earn wages." Perry, 296 N.C. at 94, 249 S.E.2d at 401.
49. West, 62 N.C. App. at 268, 302 S.E.2d at 646; Cook, 61 N.C. App. at 563, 300 S.E.2d at
853.
50. Cook, 61 N.C. App. at 564, 300 S.E.2d at 854.
51. West, 62 N.C. App. at 268, 302 S.E.2d at 646.
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31(24) (1979).
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bling injury arguably affects some important "part" of the body, requiring dis-
abled claimants to recover only under section 97-31 would eliminate the
possibility that any claimant ever would be able to recover under section 97-
29. All permanently injured claimants would receive only the limited com-
pensation available under section 97-31's schedule. A claimant, however,
should not be foreclosed from the opportunity to prove permanent and total
disability, and to obtain an award under section 97-29, just because his injury
may be described as an injury to an "important organ or part of the body."
In the West and Cook cases the court of appeals fashioned an interpreta-
tion of section 97-31 that departed from the Perry rule established by the
North Carolina Supreme Court. The court of appeals' approach, however,
serves the policies underlying the Workers' Compensation Act better than the
Perry approach. The West and Cook decisions are consistent with the earning
impairment principle of compensation. They set a precedent that will produce
equitable results in cases of workers who suffer injuries compensable under the
schedule, but who nevertheless are unable to resume working as a result of
their injuries. Furthermore, the construction of section 97-31 proffered by
Cook and West was necessary to prevent emasculation of section 97-29 of the
Act. Given these considerations, the supreme court should reevaluate Perry
and adopt the West-Cook construction of section 97-31.
JOHN DAVID MAYBERRY
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